Reporting and opinion by Mathew Carr
Sept. 14, 2026 — Sorry to sound frustrated….This is the theme of the proposed meeting on Nov. 9 in Turkey:
The Ambition Dialogue will focus on authorization under Article 6.2, with particular attention to the considerations that inform Parties’ decisions to authorize* internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) for use towards the achievement of an NDC (nationally determined contribuation) or for use for other international mitigation purposes (eg for the airlines CORSIA market).
Authorizations specify what countries (and potentially companies) are permitted to do with the ITMOs they sell and buy— including which country can transfer them, which country can receive them, and critically, what purposes they can be used for (such as counting toward a country’s Nationally Determined Contribution, or NDC, which is like an emissions target) or used in the global airline carbon market, for instance. It’s shocking to me these issues have not been sorted out in the 11 years since the Paris deal was struck in 2015. This is the most basic building block of a global carbon market.
It continues:
“The discussion will explore how Parties (countries) approach authorization in practice, including how considerations related to NDC implementation, environmental integrity, safeguards and other relevant national circumstances inform their decision-making.”
Yet. here is the clincher, for me:
Participants will be invited to complete a short survey to share their views on possible topics and format for the Ambition Dialogue to be organized in conjunction with SBI 66 (June 2027).
So it’s a meeting about a proposed meeting in June 2027.
So, here we are in September 2026 planning a meeting for November where participants will be invited to complete a “short survey” for another meeting in June 2027.
Is there a climate crisis or not? Where is the urgency?
Still, to be fair, it’s tough to get 197 countries to agree anything on climate. And the market will only work if every country is on board. If a country is not on board, it might win reckless fossil-fuel-based investment. Perhaps I’m too impatient.
Claude:
ITMO Authorizations in Article 6.2 of the Paris deal, one of two new UN markets; the other is under Article 6.4
ITMO authorizations are essential to Article 6.2 because they establish the legal foundation that countries need before they can transfer or use carbon credits in bilateral climate cooperation.
Notes
Context: What Authorizations Control
Authorizations specify what countries are permitted to do with ITMOs — including which country can transfer them, which country can receive them, and critically, what purposes they can be used for (such as counting toward a country’s Nationally Determined Contribution, or NDC). Without authorization from both participating parties, no ITMO transaction can legally proceed. [CarrZee: I believe this last statement might be contested by some countries and/or companies who believe Paris is not definitive on ITMO use.]
Key Purposes of Authorization
Preventing Misuse and Double-Counting
Authorizations ensure that ITMOs are used only as intended between cooperating countries. One of the cornerstone requirements of Article 6.2 is that countries apply “corresponding adjustments” to their emissions inventories — meaning the host country removes the credits from its own account when they’re transferred, and the receiving country adds them (if counting toward its NDC). Authorizations enforce these adjustments by specifying exactly which entities are authorized to use which ITMOs in which ways.
Tracking and Transparency
Authorizations must be reported and made publicly available through the Centralized Accounting and Reporting Platform (CARP) and the International Registry, which tracks ITMOs from issuance to use or transfer. This creates a transparent record that helps prevent fraud and ensures accountability.
Flexibility for Changes
The Article 6 rules allow countries to modify their authorizations as circumstances change—whether due to technical issues (like reversed emission reductions), procedural changes (like altering which entity is authorized), or policy shifts. However, the rules around how and when these changes can be made remain somewhat unclear, and countries continue to seek clearer guidance on authorization amendments. OECD
The Broader Context
Article 6.2 enables countries like Switzerland to finance climate projects in Ghana, Vanuatu, and other developing nations. Without clear authorization requirements, there would be no mechanism to ensure that credits genuinely represent additional, verified emissions reductions rather than phantom climate action. Authorizations are therefore the guardrails that keep the system credible and environmentally sound.
ChatGPT context
The really important distinction is between the ITMO’s authorisation category and what the eventual buyer does with it.
The three buckets
ITMO authorised for…
Possible user
Corresponding adjustment
NDC
Another country
Yes — transferring Party and relevant accounting
Other international mitigation purposes
e.g. CORSIA
Yes, by transferring Party
Other purposes
Potentially companies / voluntary market
Transferring Party still applies CA; buyer doesn’t necessarily
The UNFCCC’s current registry architecture explicitly allows authorised private entities to hold and transfer ITMOs.
But here’s the fascinating bit:
A company could buy an ITMO without itself having an NDC
Imagine Greece authorises 1 million tonnes for “other purposes”.
A London company buys 100,000 of them.
The company could potentially hold them, transfer them, or cancel them for a voluntary purpose, subject to the authorisation and cooperative approach. The UNFCCC reporting architecture actually contains fields for an authorised entity using or cancelling ITMOs.
But the company doesn’t acquire Greece’s NDC accounting responsibility.
Instead, the corresponding adjustment is essentially the government-side accounting consequence of authorising/transferring the mitigation outcome.
That’s why calling a corresponding adjustment simply an “obligation” can be misleading: it isn’t a liability attached to the carbon unit in the way a debt is attached to a bond. It’s an accounting adjustment made by the relevant Party under the Paris Agreement rules.
And here’s the really interesting market implication
You could therefore have something resembling:
Project → Host country authorisation → ITMO → Company → Trader → Company → cancellation
while the government accounting layer sits underneath the commercial chain.
That’s potentially quite different from a conventional carbon-credit market.
The UNFCCC itself says the international registry tracks who controls ITMOs and permits Parties to authorise public and private entities to have accounts and transfer ITMOs.
And the technical material is explicit that “other purposes” can include uses outside NDC accounting, while the Article 6.2 system still records the relevant first-transfer/use/cancellation events.
So the short version is:
The ITMO can become a tradable private-sector asset, but the corresponding adjustment is fundamentally a sovereign accounting mechanism sitting behind that asset.
That distinction could become very important if Article 6.2 develops into a genuine international carbon market, because it means you could potentially have a private trading market whose scarcity/value is partly created by sovereign authorisation and Paris Agreement accounting.
If you want, I can take the next step and explain whether an ITMO could actually be bought by an ordinary investor/speculator purely to hold it and sell it later — i.e. whether Article 6.2 could produce a carbon equivalent of a gold or commodity market.
