Mathew Carr

It’s no coincidence this country is fighting a far-right surge from a Trump fan as it stands up to big-tech bullies

–When national leaders fundamentally reshape the relationship between the state, global digital capital and press freedom, they should expect push back

Reporting and opinion By Mathew Carr

June 3, 2026 — The rapid political ascent of Trump-fan Abelardo de la Espriella—affectionately and menacingly known to his supporters in Colombia as “El Tigre”—is frequently analyzed through the lens of Latin America’s shifting security landscape.

His promises of a Bukele-style “iron fist” (*mano dura*) and 10 mega-prisons in the forest dominate headlines ahead of Colombia’s June 21, 2026 leadership election run-off.

However, reducing El Tigre’s presidential bid to a simple reaction against crime misses a deeper, structural catalyst rooted in Colombia’s economic policy and the ability of outsiders to influence the electorate.

A similar debate about the relationship between press freedom and capital is happening right now in the USA as interests associated with Donald Trump take control of famous news show 60 Minutes.

 

https://www.theguardian.com/media/2026/may/27/60-minutes-sharyn-alfonsi?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other

Corporate meddling….fear of offending power

Back in Colombia, a compelling case can be made that De la Espriella’s entry into politics in late 2024 was a direct, calculated counter-response to the implementation of the Significant Economic Presence (SEP) tax regime on January 1, 2024.

(America is seeking to grab South America’s digital and commodity resources simultaneously…Bolivia has some of the world’s largest lithium reserves, and control over lithium has become geopolitically important because of batteries, EVs, and energy storage. Massive strikes there today are linked to American grabbiness. Former president Evo Morales and his supporters have long argued that foreign powers — especially the United States and multinational corporations — sought greater influence over Bolivia partly because of those resources.)

Significant Economic Presence (SEP) regime

The SEP did more than just alter the tax code; it fundamentally reshaped the relationship between the Colombian state, global digital capital, media freedom and the domestic middle class, creating the exact economic and social friction that an entrepreneurial populist like De la Espriella needed to launch his movement.

The SEP Regime as the Peak of Progressive Economic Nationalism; India Started One in 2018

To understand El Tigre’s political entry, one must understand what happened in January 2024.

Introduced under the tax reform of President Gustavo Petro’s administration, the SEP (*Presencia Económica Significativa*) was designed to assert digital sovereignty and prevent Colombia from succumbing to the giant global propaganda machine being built by US AI and far-right interests.

For the first time, foreign entities without a physical footprint in Colombia—ranging from AI and social media providers to digital marketplaces—were subjected to a 10% withholding tax or a 3% net income tax if they maintained a deliberate, systematic interaction with the Colombian market (defined as having over 300,000 local users or displaying prices in Colombian Pesos).

For the political left, the SEP was a triumph of economic justice, forcing multinational tech giants to pay their fair share.

But for the business community and the burgeoning digital entrepreneurial class, it represented something entirely different: the aggressive expansion of a bureaucratic state eager to penalize globalization and digital integration.

The Consumer Backlash and the Outsider’s Opening

The immediate consequence of the SEP regime in early 2024 was not a sudden windfall of corporate tax compliance, but a classic case of tax incidence shifting downward.

Global tech platforms rapidly adjusted their terms of service, passing the 10% withholding burden directly onto Colombian consumers, remote workers, and small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) that relied on international digital tools for daily operations. That is even though US tech giants make a collective $400-$600 plus a year from selling and otherwise exploiting a single person’s data.

By mid-2024, everyday Colombians were feeling the literal price of progressive economic nationalism in their monthly software subscriptions and digital advertising costs.

Sense of Economic Grievance

This dynamic created an acute sense of economic grievance among the urban middle class and the business sector, who felt squeezed by an administration they perceived as hostile to modern commerce. Yet the decision to pass on the cost of the tax was unfair because these tech giants are already making huge money. It was sheer greed.

The huge tech giants are, or were, exploiting a moratorium under the World Trade Organisation that prevents tariffs on digital services.

That moratorium lapsed on March 31 this year.

But back in 2024, De la Espriella saw his opening.

When he launched his *Defensores de la Patria* movement in October 2024, his platform was explicitly built on the rejection of the Petro administration’s legacy.

As a flamboyant, millionaire defense lawyer and businessman with influencer links to Miami, De la Espriella positioned himself as the ultimate defender of private enterprise against state overreach.

Stealing and Abuse

The economic resentment generated by the first ten months of the SEP regime provided him with a ready-made, deeply motivated donor base and an electorate eager for a pro-market counter-offensive.

The SEP regime proved that the state views digital innovation not as an asset to be nurtured, but as a pocket to be rightfully picked because tech giants are making huge unregulated profits, while stealing content and abusing privacy.

El Tigre’s campaign is the predictable, ferocious immune response of a private sector that does not want to be accountable to “the people.”

Ideological Counter-Reformation: Milei’s Shadow in the Andes

De la Espriella’s economic rhetoric is heavily influenced by regional right-wing populists, most notably Argentina’s Javier Milei.

Central to his platform is the promise to drastically downsize the federal government, slash regulations, and dismantle what he characterizes as punitive taxation.

The relationship between his candidacy and the SEP regime is ideological at its core. The SEP represents the pinnacle of the state-centric, regulatory model that seeks to control cross-border capital flows.

De la Espriella’s run is a direct attempt to execute an economic counter-reformation.

He was able to frame his candidacy as a rescue mission for a country being left behind by global investors who were actively reconsidering their exposure to Colombia’s complex tax environment.

Conclusion: A Race for Colombia’s Economic and Social Identity

As Colombia approaches the final run-off on June 21, 2026, the debate between El Tigre and his leftist opponent, Iván Cepeda, is often framed as a choice between two different approaches to public safety and human rights.

Yet beneath the security rhetoric lies an equally profound battle over Colombia’s economic identity and whether it wants to mimic propagandised America.

This fight has been breaking out across South America and the world.

It’s striking that the mainstream media ignores this global fight that’s more important than the Iran violence (though linked because Iran is also against US propaganda).

The USA has successfully deployed its system of unregulated capitalism and propaganda in my home country of Australia as it has, too, in the UK, where I live now.

The establishment of Colombia’s Significant Economic Presence regime in January 2024 drew a line in the sand, signaling Colombia’s shift toward aggressive economic nationalism and digital regulation.

Abelardo de la Espriella’s entry into the race months later was a direct political consequence of that shift.

His run to be leader of Colombia in a little more than two weeks cannot be decoupled from the SEP; it is the ultimate political pushback against the regulatory state, deceptively weaponizing the economic frustrations of a digitized electorate to dismantle the “people friendly” financial architecture established at the start of 2024.

NOTES
Other similar fights

Gemini

——
Gemini unchecked:
Yes, Cambodia’s tense geopolitical and domestic political climate is directly related to its enforcement of digital services tariffs and tax modernization.
Rather than being isolated technical policies, Cambodia’s 10% digital Value Added Tax (VAT) on non-resident e-commerce and digital service providers is heavily intertwined with the ruling government’s survival strategies, border conflicts, and changing foreign alliances. [1]
The relationship unfolds across three key areas:
1. Offsetting Border Crisis & Economic Pressures
Cambodia’s economy faces severe strain from an intense regional border dispute. Following military clashes with Thailand along the Emerald Triangle border, severe trade blockages and border closures occurred. This, combined with the return of thousands of Cambodian migrant workers, has jeopardised nearly $3 billion in vital remittance income. [1, 2]
With the World Bank forecasting Cambodia’s economic growth to slow, the government is leveraging digital tax reforms to aggressively capture missing revenue. Digital services tariffs have successfully boosted Cambodia’s domestic revenue collection, helping offset broader economic shocks from these tense regional dynamics. [1, 2]
2. Funding Public Infrastructure Amid Declining Western Aid
As Cambodia’s political climate has drawn heavy international criticism for the closure of civic space and political opposition, traditional Western aid and preferential trade terms from the US and EU face persistent threats. [1, 2, 3]
To maintain political legitimacy and domestic stability, the ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) needs to fund national development independently. The government’s Cambodia Digital Government Policy relies directly on the fiscal capacity generated by these digital tariffs.
Expanding the tax base to foreign tech giants ensures a steady stream of revenue to build public services without relying on Western-backed loans that come with political strings attached. [1, 2]
3. Leveling the Playing Field for Pro-Government Local Business
From a domestic political standpoint, allowing massive, untaxed foreign tech firms to dominate Cambodia’s rapidly growing internet economy threatened local tech and e-commerce companies. Many prominent Cambodian businesses are owned by, or closely tied to, the country’s political elite. The General Department of Taxation (GDT) explicitly stated that the digital services tariff was designed to create a “fair playing field” between untaxed foreign suppliers and compliant local companies. By enforcing these tariffs, the government protects the economic interests of local business allies who form a core pillar of its political support. [1]

Following the official expiration of the global WTO e-commerce moratorium on 31 March 2026

Gemini unchecked…new itemisation, indexing:

Following the official expiration of the global WTO e-commerce moratorium on 31 March 2026, several developing nations and regional blocs have moved to prepare or implement digital tariff and customs structures. [1, 2, 3, 4]
Because “electronic transmissions” (like streaming, software downloads, and data flows) have never been formally classified under standard customs HS codes, these countries are approaching the change in two distinct ways: by laying the groundwork for digital data tariffs, or by heavily taxing physical e-commerce parcels. [3, 4, 5, 6]

1. Leading the Push for Digital/Data Tariffs [4]

A core coalition of developing countries led the opposition to the moratorium at the MC14 March 2026 summit in Cameroon specifically so they could begin drafting national digital tariff laws. [2, 4, 7]
India: Long a vocal opponent of the moratorium, India’s commerce ministry has been actively developing a framework to classify electronic transmissions. India argues that the lapse allows them to recover millions in lost customs revenue from foreign Big Tech streaming, cloud services, and software. [2, 7]
South Africa: Alongside India, South Africa has spent months researching how to technically monitor and levy customs duties at the digital border. They are focusing on taxing data bytes entering the country to protect domestic digital industries. [4]
Indonesia: Indonesia already has a baseline legal framework (Regulation 17/PMK.010/2018) that creates customs chapters for “software and other digital goods.” While the tariff rates were set to 0% while the WTO moratorium was alive, Indonesian authorities are now positioned to activate these customs fees.
Brazil: As the country that single-handedly blocked the final 4-year extension in Geneva, Brazil’s revenue authority (Receita Federal) is actively assessing tax structures to target foreign digital platforms and software providers. [8]

2. The European Union: Aggressive Physical E-Commerce Fees

While the EU supports tariff-free digital transmissions, they have chosen this exact window to launch a massive crackdown on the flood of low-value physical e-commerce shipments (primarily targeting Chinese platforms like Temu and Shein). [9]
  • Abolishing the €150 Exemption: The EU Council formally agreed to entirely remove the €150 customs duty relief threshold. [10]
  • Fixed €3 Small Parcel Duty: Starting 1 July 2026, a fixed €3 customs duty will apply to every single item in small parcels entering the EU under €150. [3, 11]
  • Universal Handling Fee: The EU is launching a mandatory, union-wide customs handling fee in November 2026. Several EU member states (including Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Romania) have already implemented their own national customs handling fees ahead of schedule. [3]

The Technical Hurdle

International trade compliance experts note that while countries like India and South Africa are legally permitted to introduce these tariffs, no country has successfully deployed a widespread, automated system to collect customs fees on invisible data packets yet. Most are currently updating their tax software and legal definitions to force multinational tech companies to self-declare their digital import volumes. [12, 13]

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