Both the BRICS meetings and the Xi-Trump meetings seemed indecisive this week…creating an anti climax.
The EU could learn from Xi about how to prevent Trump bullying. Trump more respectful while he’s in China. Still, I’m surprised China is standing buy and letting Trump dismantle the world’s sense of community and oneness.
Trump, France and the UK are refusing to let the world progress away from outdated 80-year old structures set up after WW2.
The lack of climate action and progress at the UN on nuclear deproliferation is highly disappointing.
At least the warmongering is toned down for now, slightly.
https://x.com/aseisfree/status/2055304212368531501?s=46
BRICS didn’t agree overall position on its debates….yet India, chairing, said this:
Summary by chatGPT unchecked on the UN and Security Council:
Yes. India was more specific than just saying “reform the UN.”
At the BRICS meeting, Indian foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar explicitly called for:
- expansion of both permanent and non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council,
- stronger representation for Asia, Africa, and Latin America,
- and movement from vague discussions toward actual “text-based negotiations” on reform.
The notable part is “both permanent and non-permanent categories.” That signals India does not want merely a few extra rotating seats; it wants new permanent members added to the Council structure itself.
India has long backed the so-called G4 framework with:
- India
- Brazil
- Germany
- Japan
all seeking permanent seats.
India also increasingly argues that Africa should receive permanent representation as part of any settlement. The broader logic is:
the Council still reflects the 1945 post-WWII balance rather than today’s demographics and economic power distribution.
One especially important nuance:
earlier this year India stated that “real reform” should include expansion of the permanent category with veto power, not just permanent seats without veto rights.
That is controversial because:
- current permanent members (especially China and sometimes United States positions vary by context) are cautious about diluting veto power,
- and regional rivals oppose some candidates:
- Pakistan opposes India,
- Italy often opposes Germany,
- some Latin American states resist Brazil,
- and China has historically been uneasy about Japan.
So India’s evolving vision seems to be:
- A larger Security Council,
- More Global South representation,
- New permanent members,
- Potentially expanded veto rights,
- And a shift from endless procedural talks to concrete negotiation text.
Al Jazeera :
More generally (ChatGPT unchecked)
The most striking outcome from this week’s BRICS foreign ministers’ talks in New Delhi was probably not what the bloc agreed on — but what it could not agree on.
1. BRICS failed to issue a joint statement
That is a significant signal for a bloc that markets itself as the emerging alternative to Western-led institutions.
The talks ended with only an Indian “chair’s statement” because members split sharply over the Iran–Israel–US conflict and Gulf tensions.
The key fracture:
- Iran wanted strong condemnation of US-Israeli military actions.
- United Arab Emirates resisted language Tehran supported.
- India tried to keep the bloc together with softer wording focused on sovereignty, diplomacy, and stability.
That exposed a deeper reality: BRICS is now so expanded and geopolitically diverse that consensus is becoming harder.
2. India is steering BRICS toward “practical multipolarity”
India’s chairmanship theme — “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability” — is increasingly about making BRICS functional rather than ideological.
Subrahmanyam Jaishankar emphasized:
- supply chains,
- energy security,
- technology cooperation,
- reform of global institutions,
- and resilience against geopolitical shocks.
The interesting part is that India appears to be positioning BRICS less as an anti-West alliance and more as:
a bargaining platform for the Global South.
That is a noticeably different tone from the more openly confrontational posture preferred by some members.
3. UN reform is becoming a core BRICS rallying point
One area where members did broadly align was demanding reform of global governance institutions.
India argued the UN system reflects “an earlier era” and no longer represents Asia, Africa, and Latin America fairly.
This matters because BRICS increasingly frames itself as:
- the political voice of the Global South,
- not merely an economic club.
The bloc now represents roughly 45% of the world’s population and about 40%+ of global GDP in purchasing-power terms.
4. The Iran-UAE clash inside BRICS is historically important
This may end up being remembered as the moment BRICS’ expansion strategy hit its first major geopolitical stress test.
BRICS now includes regional rivals:
- Iran
- United Arab Emirates
- plus countries balancing relations with both the US and China.
The bloc is no longer a relatively coherent five-country grouping. It is becoming something closer to a mini-UN of non-Western powers — with all the messiness that implies.
5. Energy security quietly dominated the discussions
India repeatedly stressed the risks around the Strait of Hormuz and maritime trade disruptions.
That matters because:
- BRICS members include huge energy importers and exporters,
- and many are highly exposed to shipping disruptions and oil price spikes.
So behind the rhetoric about multipolarity, a lot of the actual diplomacy was about:
- avoiding economic shock,
- stabilizing trade flows,
- and preventing regional wars from wrecking growth.
6. China’s lower-profile presence was notable
Wang Yi did not attend; China was represented by its ambassador instead.
That reduced China’s visible dominance during the talks and gave India more room to shape the agenda.
It also reinforced the sense that 2026 may be a more India-led BRICS year than recent China-heavy cycles.
Overall takeaway
The biggest development is that BRICS is evolving from:
- a relatively unified anti-Western economic grouping,
into:
- a large, internally divided coalition trying to build a post-Western order without agreeing on what that order should actually look like.
That makes the bloc simultaneously:
- more globally significant,
- but also harder to coordinate.
The world seems flaccid in the face of Trump
https://share.upscrolled.com/en/post/e71654d0-5067-11f1-8080-800118b865f2/